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PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Timothy M. Kaine*
This year, like many years, has been marked by increasing pub-
lic concern over legal ethics. Public attention has been drawn to
lawyers' participation in scandals such as the misuse of funds by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the collapse
of the savings and loan industry, and numerous ethical breaches by
members of Congress.
Despite increasing concern there has been no radical change in
the basic regulatory landscape affecting lawyer behavior. In the ab-
sence of dramatic change, however, there have been a few impor-
tant developments that may lay the groundwork for more wide-
spread reform in the future.
This survey will focus on four major subjects in the area of pro-
fessional responsibility. Part I will examine significant judicial de-
cisions affecting the substantive scope of the Virginia Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility.' Part II will discuss developments in
disciplinary enforcement by the Virginia State Bar Association, the
professional association with mandatory jurisdiction over all law-
yers practicing in the Commonwealth.2 Part III will focus specifi-
cally on the growing use of sanctions in state and federal litigation
as a way to regulate trial conduct.3 Finally, Part IV will examine
the growing ethical critique of hourly billing methods.4
I. ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
Virginia lawyers are governed by the Virginia Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (the "Code" or "Code of Virginia"), an ethi-
cal code adopted as part of the Rules of the Supreme Court of
* Director, Mezzullo & McCandlish, Richmond, Virginia; Adjunct Associate Professor of
Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; J.D., 1983, Harvard Law
School; 1979, A.B., University of Missouri.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 5-18.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 19-24.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 25-33.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 33-39.
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Virginia in 1983.5 The Code is modeled closely after the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Model Code") promul-
gated by the American Bar Association ("ABA") in 1970.6 While
the ABA replaced the Model Code with its Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct ("Model Rules") in 1983, the Virginia bar contin-
ues to operate under its version of the Model Code.
The Code is composed of a series of Canons that express broad
duties of lawyers (e.g., "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zeal-
ously Within the Bounds of the Law").8 Within each Canon are
mandatory Disciplinary Rules and hortatory ethical considerations.
The Code is enforced principally through a lawyer's own conform-
ity to required behaviors. Apart from self-enforcement, the most
active enforcer of the Code is the Virginia State Bar.
During the past year, certain state and federal cases have signifi-
cantly interpreted the provisions of the Code. In Gunter v. Vir-
ginia State Bar,9 the Supreme Court of Virginia considered the
question of what type of misconduct by a lawyer will support a
disciplinary sanction. The conduct at issue was a lawyer's arrange-
ment to have a private investigator place a bugging device on his
client's home phone to determine whether the client's wife was in-
volved in an extramarital affair. The wife discovered the plan and
initiated criminal charges against the lawyer for conspiracy to vio-
late the Commonwealth's wiretapping statute. Although the lawyer
was acquitted of criminal charges, the Virginia State Bar ordered
that his license be suspended for thirty days, finding that he had
violated Disciplinary Rule 1-104(A)(4), which prohibits "conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation which re-
flects adversely on a lawyer's fitness to practice law."'" The impor-
5. VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 6, § 11 (1990).
6. While the Code of Virginia tracks the Model Code, there are some significant differ-
ences. Compare ABA MODEL CODE DR 7-106(B)(1) (1980) (requiring a lawyer to disclose to
a tribunal controlling precedent contrary to his/her position) with VA. CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-105 (Repl. Vol. 1990) (no disclosure requirement).
7. Lawyers practicing in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia operated under both ethical guidelines until recently. Prior to February 15, 1989, the
Local Rules of Practice for the Eastern District required practitioners to follow the ethical
rules promulgated by the ABA and the Virginia State Bar. Because the Code of Virginia and
Model Rules differ and even contradict one another in part, the obligation was difficult to
fully perform. The Local Rules were amended effective February 15, 1989, however, and now
simply require that federal practitioners comply with the Virginia Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility. LOCAL R. OF THE E.D. VA. 7(I) (1990).
8. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
9. 238 Va. 617, 385 S.E.2d 597 (1989).
10. Id. at 622, 385 S.E.2d at 600.
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tance of Gunter is its discussion of the kinds of misconduct for
which disciplinary sanctions are appropriate. The wiretapping inci-
dent at issue violated no specific disciplinary rule in the Code, nor
was the conduct considered criminal, at least in the'eyes of the
jury. But, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmatively noted that
mere compliance with the law was not sufficient for a lawyer."
Even following the specific requirements of the Code may not be
enough to satisfy one's professional obligation: "[t]he traditions of
professionalism at the bar embody a level of fairness, candor, and
courtesy higher than the minimum requirements of the ,Code of
Professional Responsibility."' 2
The court affirmed the Virginia State Bar's sanction on the
grounds that the behavior was clearly "deceit" within standard
dictionary definitions of that term. The court did not explicitly
find that Gunter's deceit "reflects adversely on his fitness to prac-
tice law." Likewise, the court did not specifically sanction the "de-
ceit" because it occurred in Gunter's practice rather than his per-
sonal life. Perhaps it concluded that any deceit by a lawyer would
affect his/her ability to practice. If so, the ruling highlights the
broad extent to which discipline may be meted out for conduct
that is legal and not in violation of any specific disciplinary rule.
In another substantive area, the United States Supreme Court
continues to struggle with the extent to which professional at-
tempts to regulate the content of lawyer advertising, such as those
contained in Canon 2 of the Code of Virginia, can be reconciled
with first amendment protection of "commercial" speech. 3 In Peel
v. Lawyer Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois,4
the Court reviewed disciplinary sanctions imposed against an Illi-
nois lawyer who held himself out as a "certified trial specialist," in
violation of Illinois' Code of Professional Responsibility.' 5 The cer-
11. Id. at 622, 385 S.E.2d at 600.
12. Id.
13. The United States Supreme Court decided two other cases during the 1990 term deal-
ing with the First Amendment rights of lawyers. In FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers
Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990), the Court held that a group of lawyers "on strike" for higher
pay in local court appointments violated the Sherman Act. The Court rejected the lawyers'
claims that their boycott was speech protected by the first amendment. In Keller v. State
Bar of California, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990), the Court unanimously held that the State Bar of
California could not, consistent with the first amendment, require members to pay bar fees,
a portion of which were used to advocate political and ideological causes that the petitioners
did not support.
14. 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990).
15. ILL. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 2-105(a)(3) (1985) (repealed Aug. 1,
1990]
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tification, granted by a private organization of trial lawyers, pro-
voked a bizarre split of opinions in which the sanctions were re-
versed on first amendment grounds even though a six-member
majority of the Court found the advertised certification was at
least potentially misleading so as to justify state regulation. 16
The decision in Peel announces no new standard for review of
commercial speech-the majority used the standard announced by
Justice Powell in the 1982 case of In Re R.M.J.,7 which focuses on
the state's right to prohibit deceptive speech and otherwise regu-
late speech with the capacity to mislead. But, the fractured nature
of the opinion does suggest that, except in the most obvious cases
of deceptive advertising, review of state regulation of professional
advertising will be on a case-by-case basis, providing little guid-
ance for behavior away from the extremes. The reason for this lack
of clarity is the Court's confusion over the justification for restric-
tions. on advertising. The need for such restrictions depends di-
rectly upon one's assumptions about the sophistication of consum-
ers of legal services, but the Court (and profession generally) has
failed to articulate consistent assumptions on that critical issue.' s
1990). This rule generally provided that a lawyer may not "hold himself out as 'certified' or
a 'specialist.'" Id. The provision is similar to that contained in Rule 2-104 of the Virginia
Code of Professional Responsibility. See VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIxTY DR 2-
104 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
16. In Peel, a four-member plurality stated that the certification label was not misleading
and could not, therefore, subject the petitioning lawyer to disciplinary sanctions. Peel, 110
S.Ct. at 2290 (plurality opinion of Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Brennan and Blackmun). Jus-
tice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, concurred separately, finding that the advertised
certification was potentially misleading so as to justify some regulation, but not problematic
enough to support a total prohibition. Id. at 2294. Justice White dissented, finding the ad
"potentially misleading" and concluding that the burden should be on the lawyer to elimi-
nate any potential problem. Id. at 2297. Finally, Justice O'Connor authored a dissent, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, finding the certification "inherently likely to
deceive" the public and arguing for deference to state regulation of its content. Id. at 2298.
17. 455 U.S. 191 (1982). The opinion defines the extent of proper regulation as follows:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the
First Amendment. But when the particular content or method of the advertising sug-
gests that it is inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such
advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions. Mis-
leading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the States may not place an abso-
lute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading information, e.g., a list of
areas of practice, if the information also may be presented in a way that is not
deceptive.
Id. at 203.
18. As Justice Stevens' plurality opinion notes, the dissent by Justice O'Connor is partic-
ularly erratic in this regard, assuming that potential clients have little sophistication in
some areas and great discernment in others without providing any meaningful distinction.
110 S.Ct. at 2290, n.13.
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II. DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE
Enforcement of the Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility
is primarily carried out via lawyers conforming their own behavior
to its requirements. When self-regulation does not work, the Vir-
ginia State Bar Association acts to investigate behavior and en-
force the Code,
The Virginia State Bar acts on the basis of complaints received
from third parties or initiated internally. The number of com-
plaints has generally increased in the past 6 years; in 1984 there
were 569 complaints initiated while 1065 complaints were filed
during fiscal year 1989. The type of complaints is instructive; in
1989, 36% of the complaints alleged general neglect or poor com-
munication with the client, 16% alleged fraud, 12% alleged general
incompetence, and the remaining complaints were spread across a
wide range of problems including conflicts of interest, misappropri-
ation of funds and excessive fees. During 1989, sanctions, ranging
from suspension to private reprimand to dismissal with terms,
were imposed on 89 lawyers involved in 125 complaints. 19
In June of this year, the Supreme Court of Virginia approved
changes to the lawyer discipline system established by the Virginia
State Bar. That procedure is contained in part 6, section IV of the
Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.20 The basic procedure
calls for complaints to be referred from the State Bar to one of ten
district committees following a preliminary investigation by Bar
Counsel.2 ' Complaints were traditionally resolved in confidential
proceedings before either the district committees or a statewide
Disciplinary Board appointed by the supreme court.
Major changes to the system in 1990 include the creation of
three-member district sub-committees in each of the ten districts.
When complaints are referred from Bar Counsel, the sub-commit-
tee will take initial action at the district level. The sub-committees
have the power to accept "plea bargains" under certain circum-
stances if there is unanimous consent of the sub-committee with
19. M. Rigsby, ANNUAL PROFESSIONAL REGULATION REPORT TO VIRGINIA STATE BAR Associ-
ATION, pp. 2-4 (1989). Although final figures for complaints during fiscal year 1990 have not
been tabulated by the Virginia State Bar, the office has informed the author that complaints
increased during the year above the 1989 level.
20. VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV (1990).
21. Id. T 13(B)(5).
1990]
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agreement by the Bar Counsel and respondent lawyer.22 The crea-
tion of "plea bargain" remedies is a significant change to the en-
forcement mechanism.
Another significant change in procedure concerns the confidenti-
ality of disciplinary proceedings. While proceedings before district
committees and sub-committees will remain confidential, most
proceedings that occur before the Disciplinary Board will now be
open to the public for the first time.13 An additional element of
public scrutiny results from the addition of two non-lawyer mem-
bers to the Disciplinary Board. 4
III. LITIGATION SANCTIONS
An ethical issue of increasing concern is the use of sanctions to
punish the conduct of lawyers and litigants proceeding in state or
federal courts. In 1983, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure was amended to require a federal district court to apply sanc-
tions against a party or its lawyer if it concludes that the party has
filed a pleading that is not adequately supported in law or fact, or
has been filed for an improper purpose.25 An essentially identical
provision was passed by the Virginia General Assembly in 1987.26
The impact of sanctions in litigation has been widely debated. A
study of Rule 11 sanctions within the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit concluded that sanctions are meted out
disproportionately against plaintiffs and particularly against plain-
22. Id. 13 (B)(5)(b)(4).
23. Id. I 13(k)(5).
24. Id. V 13(C)(1).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1988). The Rule states, in relevant part, as follows:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read
the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of
existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. . . . If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon
motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a rep-
resented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay
to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing of the pleading, motion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
Id.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1 (Cum. Supp. 1990). The sanction provisions are identical
to those contained in FED. R. Civ. P. 11, but the state provision extends to oral motions as
well as written pleadings. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-271.1.
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tiffs in civil rights cases. Such a trend raises concerns about
whether the Rule improperly chills creativity in pleading, thereby
slowing new development in the law. Based on these concerns, the
United States Judicial Conference will decide in early 1991
whether to recommend any revision of Rule 11.
During 1990, both the United States Supreme Court and Su-
preme Court of Virginia considered, for the first time, legal issues
governing the application of the federal and state sanction provi-
sions. In Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,2 s the
United States Supreme Court held that a district court lacked
power under Rule 11 to sanction an entire law firm for the viola-
tion of a single partner. 29 The Court concluded that the language
of Rule 11 only allows sanctions to be imposed upon the person
who signs the offending pleading, or upon the party authorizing
it3o In Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp.,31 the Court concluded
that a district court could impose Rule 11 sanctions even after a
plaintiff had voluntarily dismissed a case. In passing on this issue,
the Supreme Court noted that an appeals court reviewing a Rule
11 sanction should use an "abuse of discretion" standard for all
aspects of any such order. Justice Stevens dissented in Cooter &
Gell, expressing his view that Rule 11 is unnecessary.3 2
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered two cases in 1990
raising the issue of when a pleading is legally warranted as re-
quired by section 8.01-271.1 of the Code." Unlike the United
States Supreme Court, which adopted an "abuse of discretion"
standard for judicial review of sanctions awards, the Supreme
Court of Virginia maintains that a lower court ruling finding that a
pleading is not legally warranted is an issue of law, not of fact.
Thus, in each case, the Supreme Court of Virginia undertook a
searching review of the legal issues involved and reversed lower
court decisions imposing sanctions.
27. "Rule 11 Tremors Continue," Nat'l L. J., July 30, 1990, at 32.
28. 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
29. Id. at 458-60.
30. Id. at 459-60.
31. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
32. Id. at 2463-65.
33. TuUidge v. Bd. of Supervisors of Augusta County,;239 Va. 611, 391 S.E.2d 288 (1990);
County of Prince Wiliam v. Rau, 239 Va. 616, 391 S.E.2d 290 (1990).
1990]
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IV. CRITIQUE OF HOURLY BILLING
The ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer shall not charge a fee that is "illegal or clearly exces-
sive." 3 4 The Code of Virginia modifies the provision by eliminating
any mandatory prohibition against excessive or illegal fees and
simply requiring that fees be "reasonably and adequately ex-
plained to the client."' 3 5 The Code also sets out, with great specific-
ity, the explanation that a lawyer must provide if he charges a con-
tingent fee.36 This provision is in accord with the conventional
view that contingency fees raise more serious ethical questions
than other forms of billing.3 7
While the profession has generally viewed fixed or hourly fees
with less suspicion than contingency fees, there has been increas-
ing criticism of hourly fees and their effect upon the nature of legal
services. Chief Justice Carrico of the Supreme Court of Virginia
has added his voice to this critique in a recent speech condemning
the hourly billing method and its consequent emphasis on the
number of "billable hours" achieved by practitioners. As Chief
Justice Carrico notes:
The increasing use of time alone as a basis for billing has contrib-
uted to the loss of professionalism. Associates' advancement, as well
as their compensation, is frequently determined as much by the
hours that they bill as the quality of their work .... As billable
hour quotas continue to grow and produce an upward salary spiral,
the public's trust and esteem for the legal profession and respect for
our system of justice decline in direct proportion .... The billable
hour malaise has infected even more than the lawyer-client relation-
ship and the efficient administration of justice. It has changed the
Bar's attitude towards non-billable obligations and altered its mem-
bers' lives at work and at home. . . . The billable hours phenome-
non leads not only to dishonesty in billing and disruption of family
life but also to neglect by lawyers of their responsibility to partici-
pate in bar activities and community affairs.38
34. ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 (1980).
35. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-105(A) (Repl. Vol. 1990).
36. Id. DR 2-105(C).
37. See, e.g., id, EC 2-22 (cautioning that lawyers should normally decline contingency fee
billing if the client is able to pay a fixed fee).
38. Address by Chief Justice Harry L. Carrico, Seminar on Professionalism (on file with
the author).
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The critique of the billable hour often fails to focus on the vir-
tues of hourly billing. Such virtues include its relative clarity and
its provision of a straightforward way for law firms to budget pro-
jected revenue. Moreover, there is nothing inherently wrong with
billing by the hour if lawyers retain the flexibility to write off time
to reach a bill that is generally equitable. The billable hour causes
problems, however, if the salaries desired by lawyers (and overhead
costs) create a need for an unreasonably elevated number of billa-
ble hours. When the billable hour expectation rises to such a level,
the system encourages overbilling, dishonesty and reduces the free-
dom of lawyers to adjust bills.
Recognizing the potential problems with the billable hour, the
ABA has recently published a book exploring the viability of alter-
native billing methods.3 9 With further escalation in lawyer salaries
and billable hour requirements, the need to explore such alterna-
tives will increase.
39. REED, BEYOND THE BILLABLE HouIL AN ANTHOLOGY OF ALTERNATIVE BILLING METHODS
(American Bar Association 1989).
1990]

